

REFLECTIONS ON THE CENTENARY OF MARX'S DEATH*

When I reflect on the passing away of Karl Marx, I am led to think not only about his achievement, but also about the man himself. I therefore think about human suffering, which I would like to discuss here in this essay. I do not want to talk about Marx's words, but rather about the spirit of his critical reflections, which was, as he said, the essence of philosophy: „[...] philosophy speaks about religious and philosophical matters in a different way than you have spoken about them”¹.

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Voltaire held that history is a picture of crimes and suffering. He expressed the disquietude pervading the period of Enlightenment. At that time, evil and suffering – till then seen as a kind of porosity in the naturally good order of the world – became objects of deeper thought. The Age of Enlightenment in its lay, deliberately a-religious attitude, thought of suffering as natural. It was the consequence of the fact that everything that happens in the world is necessarily subject to the laws of nature, including the law of universal struggle and especially the law of transition.

Voltaire held further that there was evil on Earth, and he who says that some kind of happiness can be created out of a thousand unhappy beings must be mocking us. He believed that both Leibniz and Shaftesbury wanted only to show off their intelligence. Voltaire suffered and spoke about his sufferings. These, I think, not only express Voltaire's dislike of the “learned” speculations, but suggest an important distinction between two aspects of suffering. When we think about suffering and, following Freud, seek its sources established by the power of nature, the tenderness of our bodies and the imperfection of the structure regulating the human relations, then we express its *objective aspect*. We are concerned with the other aspect of suffering when we personally experience the states which create it, when our own miseries either devoid us of it or limit our capability to analyze it. This is the *experiential aspect* of suffering, which Voltaire expressed in the words „I suffer”.

I shall discuss both those aspects in Chapter 1, „The Ontology of Suffering”, where I shall present the issues of its essence and sense.

Then in Chapter 2 I shall discuss the ways of minimizing suffering and the role philosophy plays in this respect.

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¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works* (later *CW*), vol. 1, Moscow 1975, p. 197.

1. The ontology of suffering: the question of the essens of suffering

Due to various understandings of the problem philosophers express various concepts of the essence of suffering. Generally speaking two approaches are possible:

- 1) the *phenomenalistic* one which identifies suffering with a definite set of phenomena – either those which an individual gains through internal experience, or those which characterize the individual's behaviour in the external world;
- 2) the *categorial* one which, adopting a logical approach, establishes the contents of the notion of „suffering” by relating it to the other notions, e.g. „happiness”, considered – if I may say so – as an opposition of „suffering”. As general notions – categories – are the subject of investigation here, I have called this approach „categorial”.

Both the approaches, phenomenalistic and categorial, are often applied jointly, resulting in hybrid definition such as Schmidt's proposition that suffering is an opposition of joy or happiness, a direct sense of some (spiritual) disharmony²². I shall discuss them separately, however, presenting suffering in a twofold manner: as it is presented on a phenomenological level and as it is defined by abstract thinking.

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We sometimes ascribe the term 'suffering' to *physical pain*, which despite its emotional form, manifested in its relation to the feeling of distress, seems to be part of the sphere of sensual experiences³. More often, however,

we treat suffering as a *set of various psychological experiences*, which is confirmed i.a. by the linguistic reflection on the meaning of the word „to suffer”.

The Greek „πάσχειν”, Latin „sustinere”, Old Polish „cirzpieć” did not denote the pure feeling of pain or the bitterness of elementary feeling of unpleasantness related to it. They rather indicated other phenomena, such as e.g., the consciousness that one had to stand „imposed” states, that one had to remain calm, etc.⁴

The most pertinent seems to be the opinion that the essence of suffering lies in the set of various emotions, about which one can state as follows:

- it has a specific *emotional „tone”* – often very strongly pervaded by the feeling of distress.
- The set belongs to the sphere of *complex feelings* for a number of such emotions as despair, fear, etc., manifest themselves together with the elementary feeling of distress.
- Its internal structure is often very diversified, *i.a.* because the *sources of suffering* are varied; some are caused by the disorders of human body, others by external reasons, both natural and social. It is worth stressing that we feel the suffering which other people inflict upon us – as it has been noted by Freud – much more than the other ones, for we are apt to treat them – to some extent – as an unnecessary addition to the sufferings caused by the natural phenomena.
- Finally, suffering is generally a *higher feeling*, i.e. one that results from the

² H. Schmidt, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, 9. Auflage, Leipzig 1934, p. 367.

³ Pleasure and distress are the so-called simple feelings which we oppose to the complex feelings. Pain in a certain

type of unpleasant sensation; it generally signals that the organism is in danger.

⁴ Cf. A. Brückner, *Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego (Polish Etymological Dictionary)*, Warszawa 1970, p. 63.

knowledge of concrete objective relations, thus being an outcome of mental activity⁵.

A seriously ill person suffers not only because of pain (which does not always accompany a dangerous illness), but also, and even above all, because he is conscious that the objective relations he used to maintain, and which used to be his „own world”, are being destroyed. The ill person faces a new world, which is alien to him even when the elements of his surroundings (people and objects) have not changed. It is alien, because it limits the ill person's possibilities of activity, the very thing which brings the external world closer to us, which enables us to treat it as „the world for us”. Instead, the ill person feels *helpless*; he knows that he has to give in to the „imposed” states – he is an object of the activity of others, instead of acting himself he is treated as an object.

It was this very „aspect” of suffering which Engels stressed in his letter to Albert Sorge (London, March 15, 1883), in which he informed him about Marx's death: „Medical skill might have been able to give him a few more years of vegetative existence, the life of a helpless being [...]. But our Marx could never have borne that. To have lived on with all his uncompleted works before him, tantalised by the desire to finish them and yet unable to do so, would have been a thousand times more bitter than the gentle death which overtook him”⁶.

It is also confirmed by Marx's own answers to a quiz which his daughters – Laura and Jenny – asked him to fill in: „Your

idea of happiness – to fight. Your idea of misery – submission”⁷. Submission – giving in to difficulties – is a misery for an individual, because it results from his helplessness. It happens not only in the situation discussed above – i.e., in the state of illness. We feel helpless in various social situations, e.g. when we lose someone who has been close to us, when we are forced to maintain estranged human relations in our family, in our work, in our country, etc.

The above situations result or may result in the feeling of suffering commensurable to the sensitivity and knowledge of an individual. The sense of helplessness is a constitutive element here; an important element because it underlies also the categorial approach to suffering which will be discussed later. For the time being, let us stick to the phenomenalist approach and focus our attention on one of its versions which claims that the essence of suffering is not defined by the subjective phenomena given to an individual in his internal experience, but rather certain features of *objective* human *behaviours* and *situations* which cause them. The situations and behaviours, like the ones presented at A. Kotsis' painting „The Last Cattle”, where the sale of a goat – the last support of a highlanders' family – is associated with a vision of petrified human figures with their eyes gazing lifelessly and their helplessly clasped hands, are the ones to which we are apt to reduce human suffering.

These are objective *signs of suffering*, but it is worth remembering that they are not suffering in the strict sense. An actor presenting a suffering man need not to suffer himself, a serf was not always unhappy, even

⁵ I am for Lindworsky's concept of higher feelings; see J. Lindworsky, *Psychologia eksperymentalna* (*Experimental Psychology*), Kraków 1933.

⁶ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Correspondence*, London 1934, pp. 414–415.

⁷ K. Marx, *Eine Sammlung von Erinnerungen und Aufsätzen*, Leipzig 1949.

though objectively he was overburdened with poverty and social inequality.

Without subjectivity – without human emotions – there is no suffering; it is generally absent also when there is no knowledge of the relations an individual enters into. Thus in the concept of suffering the most pertinent seems to be the phenomenism which unifies both the subjective and objective aspects of suffering. The above approach can be exemplified by the definition presented in *Philosophisches Wörterbuch* (10. Auflage), according to which suffering for man is both a spiritual state of distress, pain, sadness, including despair, and the external situation which is their cause: illness, disappointments, failure, violence and injustice one had to survive.⁸

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Our everyday belief is that suffering is accidental; our hope is the world of universal happiness, like the poets' bucolic Arcadia, free both from diseases (harnessed by medicine), and socio-genic sufferings (abolished by the development of civilization).

Without any attempt at evaluating the feasibility of such dreams, I would like to stress the fact that the conviction that *suffering* has an *accidental character*, i.e. the belief that it is accidental and marginal, became part of philosophy. It is shared also by the categorial approaches to suffering which in a certain way may refer to Aristotle's list of ten categories⁹. Two of them – „activity” (*poie n*) and „experiencing activity” (*páschein*) – were materialized in his concept of happiness and suffering. He believed

that happiness consisted in activity, in man's striving to achieve various goals; and an individual's perfection resulting from activity – eudaimony was considered the ultimate goal. Suffering is the negation of happiness so it belongs to the category of „experiencing activity”; it is a result of an individual's state of decline, passive reception of activity.

The concept was reflected in the works of many thinkers, even at the present time, which is shown by Marx's standpoint, mentioned above. The activist concept of happiness was later completed by hedonistic concepts, which found its essence in pleasure (*hedoné*) generally, in physical satisfaction.

Despite its ancient origin, hedonism became popular only later, in the 18th century, when it was fostered by the materialistically inclined philosophers of the Enlightenment: Fontenelle, La Mettrie, Helvétius, d'Alembert, Holbach, and others. They treated suffering, in accordance with the hedonistic concept of happiness, as the opposition of pleasure, as experiencing unpleasant emotions resulting from the violation of the balance between man and the world of objects¹⁰.

The influence it exerted on the modern idealistic philosophy, is testified to by the views of e.g. G. W. F. Hegel. The Spirit, which, in Hegel's opinion, is the reality of the world, calls the human being into existence „to seek his happiness”. He finds it when he achieves the „unity of his own actuality with the objective being of the World”¹¹, and then the feeling of pleasure is his share.

⁸ *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Stuttgart 1943, p. 340.

⁹ Aristotle, *The Organon*, Harvard University Press 1955, pp. 16-19.

¹⁰ The hedonistic concept of happiness and suffering is discussed at length by W. Tatarkiewicz, *Analysis of Happiness*, Warsaw – The Hague 1976.

¹¹ Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford 1977, p. 215.

But this concept is only superficially compatible with the views held in the Enlightenment and is limited to Hegel's conviction that he had created a system which had absorbed and reshaped the previous systems. Man „seeks his happiness” until he transgresses his own individuality, until his consciousness reaches a higher level. His personal experiences then become the elements of the „general self-knowledge”, components of the objective spirit, which is the spirit of mankind, established by history, proclaiming law and morality. „Happiness is found directly in the action itself”¹² from the perspective of this spirit, for only happiness enables the spirit to overcome the singularity and to rise up to the Absolute Spirit, where everything is ordered by subordination to one idea – of Beauty (in art), of God (in religion), or of the Absolute (in philosophy). Hegel ascribed an important role to suffering in this dynamic concept of happiness unknown to the Enlightenment thinkers. Happiness and suffering are not disjunct existentially here; nor are they simply complaints of life, which can be avoided. Life – in Hegel's opinion – is a divided state, where the living creatures always face the „objective externality”, the external world which threatens with destruction. The consciousness of this contradiction is the *attribute of life*, for it is pain, and pain is the „prerogative of living natures”¹³. „From pain begin the need and the urge” and thus that which enables action and, consequently, happiness¹⁴. Thus there is no happiness without suffering; the process of the development of the Absolute is realized in pain,

the process in which the individual is „melted” in the Generality; while the very „melting” is where – at the end of the „ordeal” – the light of happiness is.

There are also opinions of an entirely different character which claim that a modification of the Christian vision of salvation where the ultimate happiness for man is to be union with God. But it also embraces an opinion that the condition of an individual's happiness is the happiness of the society and that the road to it is „an ordeal”. It is not accidental that the term I used is similar to the title of the well-known novel by A. Tolstoy. Those who came to believe in the revolution thought like one of the heroes of the novel, Roshchin, who, at the end of the story whispers: „Do you realize the significance this gives to all our efforts, to the blood that has been shed, the unknown silent sufferings? [...]. The world will be rearranged for the common welfare [...]. Everyone in this hall is ready to give his life for this”¹⁵.

The thesis that suffering is inevitable need not thus lead to pessimism; it is not manifested either in Hegel's system or in any of the conceptions which referred to it. Suffering is an attribute of life for them, but it is a dynamic attribute which neutralizes itself to reveal its other side – the happiness in society.

There are also opinions of entirely different character which claim that suffering is a static attribute; something like a „substance” of life, which can be destroyed only together with life. This is the point of view of A. Schopenhauer, a citizen of Gdańsk, who believed that „alles Leben Leiden ist”. Although we strive for happiness it is an independent determinant of life, which can be

¹² Ibidem, p. 217.

¹³ Hegel's *Science of Logic*, London 1969, p. 770.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ A. Tolstoy, *Ordeal*, Moscow 1953, pp. 513–514.

removed as far as our will can be at rest, as far as we can do away with the blind force of nature and replace it with peace (which is not happiness) resulting from wisdom and intellectual occupations.

The twentieth century – the period of two World Wars, crises, and never relieved social tensions, the century overshadowed with the total destruction of man – not only failed to undermine Schopenhauer's pessimism, but rather gave him new arguments. And here we should ask what the sense of suffering is, a question which cannot be answered explicitly, but which will be posed as long as people suffer and think.

2. What Is the Sense of Suffering?

When one considers the sense of suffering, different interpretations often overlap or meet; this can be seen most clearly in the case of its *philosophic-theological conceptions*. On the one hand it is defined in a meta-physical way, which reflects the conviction that – as Pascal put it – temporal suffering would secure us from the eternal¹⁶. The premise of Christian philosophy is – as we know – the existence of life after death which is viewed from the perspective of two opposite states: it is either happy for the redeemed souls or unhappy for the penitent ones which turned their backs on God in their earthly life. God accepts pain and suffering for they purify the soul; they enable it to doubt the autonomy of mundane values and to turn to the highest one, transcendent in respect to the earthly values.

The metaphysical (extra-experiential) character of this concept is unquestionable. On the other hand, however, it contains a certain *anthropological* reflection, which

is based on the observations of life. For although suffering does not always improve, in many cases it increases the value of a human being, hardens it against the adversities of life, teaches compassion for the others' sufferings, triggers socially valuable actions, etc.

Other views upon the sense of suffering were introduced by the *concepts of the philosophy of history* and of *political sciences* which took up the problem of suffering in society. It was as early as in Kant's writings that the integrity of the „civil society”, which resulted from a union of separate individuals, but established laws common to everybody and put forward equal moral demands, was stressed. And although „our nature is not capable of it (happiness)”¹⁷ it is our duty to be good; we must treat people as goals, and never as means of our actions. That should give people equal rights to happiness regarding, of course, the level of happiness that can be achieved at all.

Hegel saw this problem differently – he not only stated his views on this question but also presented in his writings a vision of the Absolute realizing itself through the agony of human generations. People not only do but also must suffer, for only in this way – through pain-generating contradictions – the progress of superior wholes – nations and the humanity – is achieved. According to the Enlightenment tradition, Hegel considered suffering – although in his own way – a part of a meaningful world where everything has its own place and role in the integrity of existence. He thus found the meaning of suffering, but he did so only by rationalizing the world, by recognizing it as an essentially reasonable reality.

¹⁶ B. Pascal, *Thoughts*, New York 1910, p. 363.

¹⁷ *The Philosophy of Kant*, New York, 1949, p. 348.

Marx's views take a separate place among the discussed concepts. On the one hand, they refer to Hegel's theory of existence, where all that which is individual is subordinated to the development of the whole. A human being is a true man as far as his mediation helps the social reality, the reality of all men, taken together and unified to the benefit of man, to manifest itself and come-to-be. On the other hand, however, Marx did away with Hegel's idealism. A person's individuality for him is not a phenomenon created by the spirit, but a fact of nature, established in the structure of the matter, which has taken the form of individual objects. Nor is the society an abstraction raised above the material world; it is a team of real people, their creation and condition of existence, and its development and political structure are established by the relations of production.

Marx's concept of the sense of suffering is part of the above discussed philosophy of man. „The one who would not prefer to build the whole world out of his own resources, to be a creator of the world, rather than to be eternally bothering about himself, has already been anathematised by the spirit, [...] is left to sing lullabies about his own private bliss and to dream about himself at night”¹⁸. Thus man can feel true joy when he is aware that through his work he has created an object which meets the demands of another human being, and thus has „confirmed and realized his true essence, his human, social essence”¹⁹.

Marx identifies happiness with man's retrieval of his socially given identity, and he finds the source of suffering in the egoistic

individualism and in the structure of class societies it is conditioned by.

By the vision of communism he means the vision of „man's return to himself”, the vision of breaking away from individualism, which, because of its relation to the protest-inspiring suffering – must give way to social attitudes and men's real uniting in a happy society of general humanity.

Hegel's philosophy of suffering which identifies it with the conflict between the individual and the general is doubtless reflected in Marx's concept, as well as Hegel's notion of happiness is understood as harmonizing the individual with its „objective essence”. But, since Marx's concept was deeply rooted in the realities of the last century, the problem of suffering became truly a social problem, a problem which could not be solved by individualistic philosophies.

The social aspect of this problem is still topical, for social inequality, poverty, and the resulting suffering of millions of people still plague the world and make it a scene of never-ending conflicts. However, the continual progress of civilization, general increase of education and its outcome – the development of man's self-knowledge, direct the thought to the human being, to its individuality, and to the subjective sphere of relations which make it part of the society. The thought which is the outcome of the opposition to „Hegelianism” charged, as e.g. Mounier puts it, the philosophers and scientists that they forget the actual man, create a fictitious world, a world of pure objectivism without an object to confirm it²⁰. The problem of the sense of suffering has been again introduced – but on another level – in the sphere

¹⁸ *CW*, vol. 1, pp. 468–469.

¹⁹ *MEGA*, Bd. 1, pp. 546–547.

²⁰ E. Mounier, *Introduction aux existentialismes*, Paris 1962, p. 16.

of objectivity and is so presented by various versions of existentialism, both atheistic and the ones based on religious premises.

2. The pragmatics of the struggle with suffering

Modern man fights suffering above all by seeking its *causes* and the *means to prevent it*. On the one hand, thus, he attempts to remove the deficiencies of his own body and on the other hand he strives for realizing human psycho-social aspirations. Medicine – the practice, the health services, and the rehabilitation; technology and its multifarious influences upon human life; social sciences in their cognitive and normative aspects; various social and political institutions – these are some of the means which we use today to fight the causes of suffering.

These means are not always effective; we often experience suffering and cannot remove it causally, either because we do not know their cause, or because we are unable to change the situation. Must we be then reduced to helplessness? Weil, even in such cases there are means of fighting suffering; means which alleviate it, make it bearable.

Since long ago, along the physico-chemical agents which lessen the physical pain, mankind has been using the *cultural devices*, which influence the human psyche. Generally, it is stated that the above devices have three functions: of consoling the suffering ones; of rationalizing the suffering; and of compensating for it. These functions are not separable, however, for one device can fulfill them simultaneously, but the essence of each of them is different, as well as the ways in which they alleviate suffering.

In the history of the European culture the *consoling functions* have been fulfilled by the

Christian religion for a long time, it is still the source of consolation for the believers, as it is, *i.a.*, the outcome of the conviction that worldly suffering will be rewarded with eternal happiness some day. The religious consolation does not eliminate the causes of suffering; it acts – if one is to look for analogies – as a pain-killer, which relieves the pain but does not cure the illness. That is why Marx once termed religion „the opium of the people” and found it necessary to do away with it, to replace „the illusory happiness of the people” with real happiness²¹.

This negative evaluation of religion is preceded by another statement of Marx, worthy of attention. Namely, Marx states that for a man „who has either not found himself or has already lost himself again” religion is the general *raison d'être* and consolation²². Here, Marx clearly stresses the consolatory function of religion, and, even if he calls for doing away with it, he does so because he believes that, on the social scale, one cannot instead of fighting, propose extra-mundane compensation for suffering instead of removing its earthly causes.

Marx's atheism did not surpass those boundaries, for in his case the disbelief in God's existence sprang from the criticism of the religious consciousness which in turn was questioned for anthropological and socio-political reasons. Marx perceived religion as a force alien to the self-liberation of man – a justified view in the 19th century. But times have changed and that is why modern Marxism – established in the world of revaluations and social tragedies – can question, or do away with Marx's atheism and adopt the point of view of e.g. R.

²¹ *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 175-176.

²² *Ibidem*.

Garaudy, who declares both for Marxism and for the Christian faith²³.

The consolatory functions are often fulfilled, along with, or close to the scope of religion, by *art*, especially if it reveals human dignity hidden in suffering, as well as by *philosophy* or – more broadly speaking – those systems of human beliefs which draw their contents from philosophy.

Many authors in various epochs wrote about the consolation flowing from philosophy. The views of the Stoics are testimony that in this respect a lot was expected in the ancient times. Already M. T. Cicero, who had an inclination to follow the Stoic doctrine, claimed that as people have both bodies and souls, which are similarly liable to diseases, there must be two medical sciences – *medicina corporis* and *animi medicina, philosophia*²⁴. Since then philosophy has been assigned the role of soul healer, and this was stressed by e.g. Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and others.

Particular fame, however, was gained by Boethius' book *De consolatione philosophiae*, which he wrote when imprisoned. Boethius was not only a Platonist philosopher, a translator and author of commentaries on certain of Aristotle's books, but also a politician. As a consul of Theodoric, he was charged with treason, imprisoned, and, finally excused. When writing his book, he was in a true state of suffering; one cannot doubt that he had genuine reasons to seek a remedy for suffering, and that he found it in philosophy. And perhaps because of its authenticity Boethius' book had exerted influence upon human minds for a long time.

However, a lot has changed since Boethius' times (the 5th-6th century B. C.). The consolatory functions of philosophy have been transferred to another level as early as in the Enlightenment; for philosophy appeals today not to the suffering man's feelings and imagination but to his cool reason. It attempts to show suffering as a natural state, which, firstly, one has to accept, as we accept the existing nature, and, secondly, a state one must fight in the same way one fights natural phenomena.

Thus, philosophy advocates looking at suffering from a certain distance, which is an outcome of our understanding that sufferings result from human passions and desires – the elements of actual existence, which consists of good as well. Good and Evil, happiness and suffering are thus balanced in the world, and when one is suffering today, he may be happy tomorrow, when I am suffering, someone else is happy, etc. This is the essence of the *rationalization of suffering*.

Today, philosophy focusses its attention above all on the causes of suffering, especially on the causes of social evil, which makes the world absurd as Voltaire had shown in *Candide*. The same direction is followed by the reflection on suffering in the last century, when Marx and Engels stated that social evil should be fought with material force and that rationalization is of as little consequence as religious consolation.

However, philosophy can also be a means of *compensating* for suffering – it introduces positive values which can neutralize suffering. In this case it plays a similar role to art, which has compensatory functions owing to its contents and to the joy of creation.

Hegel's system, for example, is concerned not only with a theory of existence

²³ Cf. e.g. R. Garaudy, *Parole d'homme*, Paris 1975. Editor's note: We wish to say that we do not share the author's opinion at this point.

²⁴ M. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, Harvard University Press 1950, pp. 228-231.

– a phenomenon from the sphere of knowledge. It is also a work of art in its own which can, by depicting the Odyssey of spirit and creating its both compelling and optimistic image, compensate for actual suffering. It probably played such a role in the last century and that explains its great popularity at that time.

But the compensatory role of philosophy cannot be limited to the above. Philosophy is also an intellectual activity, and – as Schopenhauer put it – „it keeps us from the many dangers, misfortunes, losses and extravagances which the man who places his happiness entirely in the objective world is sure to encounter”. That this is not sheer talk can be proved by the fact that many people sought and seek protection against suffering in intellectual work – philosophical,

scientific, or literary. Voltaire opposed literary work to suffering; Marx, when he was in a similar situation, „on the verge of the grave” – as he wrote – devoted all his time to the work on *Capital*²⁵.

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Suffering has many forms, and no method of fighting it is in itself absolutely effective. Today we justly set our hopes to medicine, technology, economy, and political activities. But we must not forget that the people who suffer are different, for their sensitivity and psychical strength is varied, as well as their needs and outlooks upon life...

Translated by Sylwia Twardo

²⁵ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Correspondence*, p. 219.

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Refleksje na temat setnej rocznicy śmierci Marksa

(Polish summary)

Setna rocznica śmierci Karola Marksa jest dla autora artykułu przyczynkiem refleksji nad zagadnieniem śmierci i cierpienia, o których Marks wypowiada się nieoficjalnie, np. w osobistej korespondencji z Fryderykiem Engelsem. Marks twierdził, że istotą filozofii jest duch, filozofia mówi o sprawach religijnych i filozoficznych w inny sposób niż czyni się to na co dzień, odnosząc się do transcendencji. W XIX wieku cierpienie stanowiło przede wszystkim problem społeczny i jako taki, jak twierdził Marks, nie mógł

być on rozwiązany przez indywidualistyczne filozofie.

Artykuł nie tylko definiuje i klasyfikuje pojęcie cierpienia, ale również ukazuje kolejne etapy myślenia o cierpieniu z perspektywy poglądów takich filozofów jak Boecjusz, Voltaire, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Artur Schopenhauer i Karol Marks.

Słowa kluczowe: cierpienie, Karol Marks, ból fizyczny, szczęście, człowiek, śmierć

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(1929–2000) absolwent chemii oraz filozofii na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim. Po studiach pracował jako nauczyciel chemii i filozofii w Gorlicach. W 1965 roku przeniósł się do Gdańska i tu podjął pracę najpierw w Wyższej Szkole Pedagogicznej, a potem na Politechnice Gdańskiej. W 1968 roku uzyskał doktorat, a w 1978 habilitację. Od 1988

roku wykładał również w Gdańskim Instytucie Teologicznym. Wydał m. in. *Problem mechanicyzmu w naukach przyrodniczych* (1969), *Byt i myślenie. U źródeł marksistowskiej ontologii i logiki dialektycznej* (1980), *Przyrodznawstwo – dzieło ludzi i cząstka kultury* (1998) oraz *Przyrodznawstwo i materializm przyrodniczy w XIX wieku* (2001).